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The changes that have taken place In the world in the recent past have been extraordinary. 
The disintegration o f  the Soviet Union and their allied nations has drastically changed the political 
climate o f the world. A nation that has laid an extremely unique relationship with the Soviet 
Union, as well as the rest o f the world, in particular the United States, is Cuba. It is logical to 
assume that the situation facing Cuba in the future will reflect the changes throughout the world.
The purpose o f this paper will be to discuss and critically analyze several of what has 
seemed the most likely or logical o f potential courses for the future of Cuban politics, and the 
future o f Fidel Castro. There are of course countless variations possible within each o f the 
following scenarios, and numerous other options that have not been considered below. However 
the scenarios discussed have been judged to be the most credible and likely. O f the scenarios 
discussed, 1 shall argue that the most likely is that of Fidel Castro attempting to diversify the Cuban 
economy and moving away from both the former Soviet Union and the United States.
It Hliiory
In order to understand and discuss the future direction of a nation, it is first necessary to 
have a knowledge o f that nations past. Cuba was discovered by Christopher Columbus on his first 
voyage to the “new world" in 1492, and became the first Spanish colony. As the first o f the many 
Spanish colonies in the new world, Cuba immediately became unique. Cuba would remain in one 
way or another unique throughout her history, up to and including today. The history1 of Cuba can 
be divided into four basic periods: The time of Spanish colonization: Cuba as a U.S. Protectorate 
under the Platt Amendment: Cuba under Batista: and the Castro years.
When Cuba was colonized, the indigenous populations were decimated, both by military 
attack, and more efficiently, by disease. Since the Spaniards could not use the indigenous 
populations to work in the fields for them, they turned to the services o f African slaves. This fact 
was extremely important for the future o f the island, as It changed the racial composition o f Cuba. 
Although the other areas of Latin America became racially mixed, the Mestizo populations o f Cuba
9
4m.
were different. There was of course the mixture o f Spanish* or whites, with blacks throughout 
Latin America, but primarily the Mestizos were of a Spanish-Indigeneous decent. Although this 
difference may not seem important in today's world, it would be important to Cuba's development, 
due to Me racist sentiments against blacks in the United States.
The African slaves were needed in Cuba because the economy o f the island was then, as it 
is now, agriculturally based, and extremely labor intensive. Since the indigenous populations had 
been decimated, blacks were the only source of labor that was cost effective enough to employ.
As well as being the flrst o f the Spanish colonies, Cuba was also the last to gain its 
independence from Spain. It was not until 189# that the Spanish relinquished control o f Cuba. At 
this point however Cuba still did not gain a true sense of independence and sovereignty. After the 
completion of the Spanish-American War, Cuba became the protectorate of the United States.
The United States had long had an interest in controlling the island, and on several 
occasions had offered to purchase it from Spain. The geographic location of Cuba, 90 miles off 
the coast o f Key West and situated in the middle o f the Straights o f Florida, gave Cuba a high 
strategic value for the US. If Cuba were to fall into enemy hands, it would be a dangerous outpost 
from which to launch an attack on the United States. This sort o f mentality persisted throughout 
Cuba's history, and was apparent as late as the 1960s, as the Cuban Missile Crisis has shown. 
And if the island were controlled by the U.S., it would be valuable in the effort to exert ftirther 
control on, and impose “stability" over the rest of the Caribbean.
Throughout much of the 19th century, many people in the United States felt that “for 
reasons of geography...and cultural heritage, the island was incapable of self government",1 and 
would ultimately become a part o f the United States. There was talk of annexation o f Cuba, and 
making her a state in the union, but racist views in the US with regards to the racial composition of 
the island, as has been discussed above, stood in the way.
Uules R. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution. (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 9.
3In 1901 the United States wrote and imposed upon Cuba The Platt Amendment* litis  gave 
the United States the right to intervene in the domestic affair and intematloaa! relations o f Cuba. In 
short the amendment allowed the United Suites to control every aspect o f Cuban politics If 
Washington so desired. The US would of course use this right, as well as Marines, to "protect" 
the Cuban people. For the most part, the US would be protecting Cuba from herself.
The attitude toward Cuba at this time was that her people were uneducated, stupid and lazy. 
This was shown in the political cartoons of the time. Prior to Cuban independence, Cuba was 
portrayed as a beautiful and virtuous white woman, often Lady Liberty. After the war however the 
image of Cuba became a sloven, uneducated, black, unruly little brat. It was assumed that the US 
needed to keep her in line, and teach her the proper way to do things.
During the sugar boom US expansionism shifted. US investors started where the pioneers 
had left off, and the calvary was replaced by the gunboat. Ownership of Cuban growing lands and 
mills became concentrated in the hands of foreign investors, predominantly from the United States. 
As Cuban land owners defaulted on their loans, the large US companies would t?ke over the land. 
In the process accumulating huge tracks of Cuba's best arable land. In 1928 for example, sugar 
mills owned by United States investors were producing 75% o f Cuba's sugar.2
Gerardo Machado became President o f Cuba in 1925. Machado quickly became the most 
brutal and corrupt leader that Cuba had ever seen. There was large and widespread opposition to 
Machado. In 1933 a sergeant in the Cuban military. Fulgencio Batista, led a coup and successfully 
ousted Machado from the Presidency.
Batista did turn the formal reigns of power over to a civilian, Ramon Grau San Martin. 
However, in reality, Batista still ruled the country. Batista would dominate Cuban politics, and 
lead Cuba, both directly and through “puppets" until the revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro 
took power from him.
^Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, 
Press, 1989, 2nd ed.), pp. 252.
i'tbWAu Latin America (New York: Oxford Univenity
A subject o r much debate throughout the years has been Castro's Ideological belief! at the 
time he took power* Them ate those who felt Fidel Castro was a communist when he and his 26th 
o f July Movement took power from Batista in 1959. This however is not true. There has been no 
evidence that Fidel was cttftmufiist. He was not a member of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), 
and lit fact Fidel had a long history of antagonism with the communist party.3 A better view of 
Castro's political orientation is that he was then, is now, and has always been a nationalist. It is 
quite possible that Fidel had anticipated a break with the United States, and that he would have to 
tum to the Soviet Union. This type of planning would not have been done however out of a belief 
in Marxism or Leninism, but rather a belief that the only way for Cuba to maintain a truly 
sovereign position - not to mention Fidel being able to avoid U.S. overthrow - would be for Fidel 
to move away from U.S. influence. A logical move in this situation, given the political climate of 
the time and Cuba's economic situation, would be for Castro to look toward, and move toward, 
the Soviet Union.
There has also been some debate as to whether or not a flawed U.S. policy pushed Castro 
into the arms of the Soviets or not. There is no hard evidence, however, that this was the case It 
appears that Castro had in fact planned to move away from the United States from the beginning. 
TMsdoes not mean he planned to become a communist, but he must certainly have known that the 
possibility existed, and there was a chance that his hand would be forced in that direction. 
Another, and better view, is that “U.S. actions probably influenced the pace o f revolutionary 
change in Cuba more than its ultimate direction.''4 This would be the more logical answer. Given 
the previously mentioned details on Castro's feelings toward the communists, this view o f the way 
history has unfolded seems to be the more credible.
Whether or not Castro had any communist bones in his body, he was without doubt 
nationalistic to the core. Castro has always been more interested in action than theory, and what he
3 Allen Luxenburg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro Into the Arms o f the Soviets" in Irving L. 
Horowitz (ed.), Cuban Communism (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishing, 1989, 7th 
ed.), pp. 13*37.
4Luxenburg, “Did Eisenhower push Castro," pp. 24.
5thinks the tin t direction is for Cube rather than fact. In addition to being a  nationalist, Fidel was 
also a Fidelista. Fidel has a feeling that he and he alone holds the “ttudt”, and it is only he that wilt 
be aide to lead Cuba in the proper direction.5
As for being revolutionary, C utro  vowed to spread his revolution throughout Latin 
America. Castro vowed to turn the Andes into the Sierra Maestro of South America. Based on this 
attitude, it is important to note as a possibility, “...that it was principally to seek protection from 
U.S. military power that Cuba turned to the Soviet Union in the first place."'1 As the relationship 
between the United States and Castro deteriorated Castro may have felt that the only hope for his 
continued presence, was to enlist the help of the Soviet Union.
It did not take long for tempers on both sides, the U.S. and Cuba, to flare, and events to 
run out of control after the revolution. In the process the relationship between Cuba and the United 
States was tested to the limits, until finally it snapped. Throughout 1960 and 1961 Cuba and the 
United States traded blows with one another. In June of I960 the U.S. oil companies refused to 
process the oil that Cuba had purchased from the Soviet Union. In response to this action, Cuba 
nationalized the oil companies. From this point foreword there was a series of events, in which 
each government tried to get the last word in, leading to the imposition of the U.S. trade embargo 
upon Cuba, and finally on January 3, 1961, the U.S. government broke diplomatic and consular 
relations with Cuba all together. A total embargo, prohibiting both imports from, and exports to 
Cuba was not in place until February of 1962,7 but by then the relationship between the two 
nations was totally adversarial.
U.S. policy toward Castro's Cuba was flawed from the very beginning. The U.S. tried to 
bully Fidel Castro, a tactic that worked no better then than it does today. After such actions as the
5Authors conversation with Wayne S. Smith at Loyola University, Chicago II., February 5,1992. 
All o f the material presented was taken from my notes on the lecture given by Prof. Smith, and the 
conversation we engaged in after.
6Wayne S. Smith, ’T he Cuban-Soviet Alliance,” in Wayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales 
Dominguez (eds.), Subject to Solution: Problems In Cuban-U.S. Relations. (Boulder Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp I.
7Estaban Morales Dominguez and Hugo M. Pons Duarte, T h e  Economic Issues from Cuba's 
Perspective," Smith and Dominguez (eds.), Subject to Solution, pp. 89-90.
eBay o f Pigs disaster and the counties* failed assassination attempts, Castro's posMenoiiiy became 
stronger within Cuba. Since Castro took power, only two U.S. Presidents have made any effort at 
all to come to terms with him. The first was President Kennedy. Before he was able to 
accomplish anything however he was struck down by an assassin's bullet. It is very difficult to 
speculate as to exactly what would have happened if Kennedy had not been assassinated.
Although at the time o f his death it appeared to many people that he was moving toward a more
flexible position on Cuba, it is difficult to say whether or not this would have changed events. 
Kennedy's history toward Cuba was varied. The Bay of Pigs invasion had been planned during 
his predecessor's administration, but had grudgingly received his approval, and took place during 
his watch. Later, in October of 1962. his handling of the missile crisis showed him to have been 
quite a bit more capi >le with regards to U.S.-Cuban relations. While the outcome of this situation 
showed that Kennedy handled the crisis well, it is widely assumed that Castro and Cuba as a 
government were never a  factor, or players in the events that transpired.' Rather it is excepted that
the missile crisis was between Moscow and Washington, Kroschev and Kennedy.4 Castro and 
Havana were left on the sidelines.10
The second President to attempt to resolve the problems that faced the United States and 
Cuba was President Carter. Hie Carter Miietive, however, was inhibited by poorly executed 
diplomacy, and an obvious indecision over what U.S. objectives actually were with regards to 
Cuba.11 These efforts were abandoned when Ronald Reagan became President. Reagan took a
"Raymond L. Garthaff. Reflections on the Cuban Mi—ile Crisis. (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
institution. 1987). This conclusion was aMe to be drawn upon the reading of the entire piece. 
Cuba’s lack o f involvement was rather taken for gmntcd in this as well as most works on the
’Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Four Days with Fidel: A Havana Diary,” in The New York Review of 
Books. March 26, 1992, pp. 22-29.
l0Raymond L. Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The View from the Soviet Side," in Horowitz 
(cd.). Cuban Communism, dp. 107-121.
"W ayne S. Smith, The Closest o f Enemies. (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1987). Much o f this book discusses Prof. Smith’s first hand accounts o f  the diplomatic initiatives 
and failures o f the Carter Administration with regards to Cuba. Prof. Smith was the head of the 
U.S. Interests Section in Havana during the Carter Administration and part o f  the Ri 
Administration, until he resigned in protest to the actions taken by President Reagan with 
Cuba.
to
7much tougher, and often as is the case with regards to U.S. policies in Latin America, 
contradictory stance toward Cuba and Communism in general. While professing to care about the 
“oppressed” peoples of Latin America who were living under Communist dictators, Reagan 
refused to accept thousands of Cuban citizens who had already been allowed by both the U.S. and 
Castro to emigrate.12 It is exactly this sort of contradictory diplomacy that has exacerbated and 
prohibited the resolution of problems between the U.S. and Cuba. When a nation professes one 
thing publicly, and takes actions which run contrary to those public (and private) statements, the 
opposing nation can not help but be confused and annoyed. In this sort of atmosphere, the 
reaching of accords between governments is nearly impossible. This however may overstate the 
issue. Although Reagan's actions did run counter to his rhetoric and did show that his policy goals 
in Latin America were different in practice from those stated, at least with regards to Cuba, he was 
consistent in this. Reagan took no actions throughout his Presidency which could in any way be 
construed as soft on Cuba. As well, Castro and the Cuban Government knew prior to Reagan's 
election that he would take a much harder line than had been the case with Carter, and therefore 
should not have been overly surprised by any of Reagan's actions.
3t S c c n a r io iilh c  J j a u r?
What does the future hold for Cuba, Fidel Castro, and the relationship between Cuba and 
the United States? Will the United States attack Fidel Castro? Will Castro move toward political or 
economic reform? Will the United States have a change of heart toward Fidel Castro and Cuba? 
fliere are five possible scenarios examined.11 After outlining the particulars of each scenario, 
there will be a critique, analyzing the pros and cons of the scenario, and a discussion of why each 
of the possibilities will either succeed or fail. When considering the future direction for the U.S.-
,2Ibid.
13There are far more options that may or may not unfold than shall be discussed within this paper. 
As with anything else, there are infinite variations possible, each of which could alter the scenario 
put forth so drastically tint it would need to be discussed in its own right. Therefore only the most 
iike?y o f logical (as I have seen them) shall be discussed, as otherwise this paper would be too 
large to p rk  up.
8Cuban relationship and Cuba's political direction, there are two main actors which must obviously 
be considered. The first is the United States and the direction in which it chooses to conduct their 
foreign policy. The other is of course Cuba, and the direction Fidel Castro chooses to take his 
nation. When considering Cuba, it is useful at times to look no farther than Fidel Castro. Castro's 
personalistic brand of leadership means that Cuba will sail in the direction Fidel decides on a given 
day. While this may at times prove radical and unpredictable, it also means he is capable of 
changing his mind on matters for the better. Fidel is never completely locked into a position. This 
is significant, as it means that very few options can be totally ruled out.
While there are five basic scenarios that will be examined, there are within some of these 
more than one course that may be followed. The first possibility is military options. Under the 
aegis of military options there are three separate possibilities to be discussed. The first possibility 
is that the Cuban exiles, which are primarily based ir Miami, will mount a large scale invasion of 
Cuba in much the same fashion as the Bay of Pigs. The second route is a small group, three to ten 
individuals, will try to land covertly and attempt to rally the masses against Fidel Castro. They 
would attempt to spur popular opinion in their direction, and hope for a grass roots movement to 
develop capable o f leading to the transition of power away from Fidel Castro. The last o f  the 
military options considered is a covert operation, carried out by a section of the United States 
Government, most likely the CIA, with the goal of assassinating Fidel Castro.
The second scenario examined is that Fidel Castro will be forced to step down by forces 
within Cuba, such as the way political events have transpired in the former Communist nations of 
Eastern Europe. Due to the lack of support from the former Soviet Union, Castro will no longer 
be able to provide for the same standards of living for the Cuban masses. The people of Cuba will 
become disenchanted with communism, Fidel Castro's rhetoric, and Fidel Castro. They will move 
toward a democratic and open market system, which holds the promise for a better life.
The next scenario shall deal with international realignments. There are two basic paths that 
could be followed. The first is that the United States Government will change it's position with 
regards to Fidel Castro based on the changing political climate o f the world. U.S. leadership, for
9various reasons, would move either openly or covertly to reestablish ties with Cuba, leading to the 
normalization of diplomatic relations. This does not necessarily mean all o f the problems existing 
between the two nations would be resolved, but there would be normalized discussion. Through 
the use o f this mechanism its possible that some of the barriers between the two nations could be 
knocked down. The second path is that Fidel Castro will turn away from the old Soviet Union and 
Communist aligned states, away from the United States, and toward other third world and non- 
aligned states. Castro would make an effort to trade primarily with these nations, with a focus on 
Latin America. He will as part of this effort move away from communism and toward ideology. 
This would not prohibit a shift to either a mixed, or free market economy.
The last scenario to be considered is that Fidel Castro will democratically reform Cuba from 
above. The particulars of this shift, such as his reasons, the manner in which he attempts to 
accomplish the shift, and the results of such efforts will vary, These variations shall be discussed, 
as well as the possible results of such actions.
IxLMIlitary QpUoni
One option for Cuba's future that has always been popular among a certain clearly defined 
sector within the U .S.14 has been the Cuban exiles living in Miami, which has always disliked 
Fidel Castro, and favored his overthrow, would mount an invasion of Cuba, and try to remove 
Castro on their own. This invading force could take two forms. The first form would be a large 
scale, fully armed, military style force, similar to that used at the Bay o f Pigs. The size o f this new 
group would most likely be larger however, but this is not o f crucial importance. The second form 
the invading force may take would be a small group of men, three to ten, that would attempt to 
initiate a grass roots military movement to oust the current government, and Fidel Castro from
14The "clearly defined sector" includes the Cuban exiles and their groups, and the conservative 
wing o f the Republican Party. While there may be other sectors within the U.S. that opposes 
Castro, and may favor this scenario, they are not as closely associated with this viewpoint, and 
therefor are not included at this point.
power. This second form is similar to that taken recently by the three individual apprehended by 
the Cuban authorities.
The first possibility is that a large and well armed invasion force invades the island. The 
guerrilla force would take up an organized, military style struggle against Castro’s government. In 
the process o f so doing, they would attempt to enlist the support of the Cuban population, and 
convince them to join forces in the overthrow of Fidel Castro. This would be necessary, as 
without the support of the peasantry, any such invasion would be doomed to failure(as would have 
been the case with Fidel’s revolution in the 50’s). In order to gain the support of the people, it 
would be necessary to offer them hope for improvement of their situation. Fidel Castro still holds 
much support from the peasants, as they know it was Castro who is responsible for the level at 
which they now live, a level that is higher than at any point throughout the history of Cuba.
Although Fidel Castro has helped a great many people within Cuba and has brought higher 
levels of education, literacy and basic social services to the average Cuban person than is the case 
throughout Latin America, the Miami exiles (as I shall refer to this invading force) feels that the 
Cuban people will be ready for a change. The Miami exiles have obviously never liked Fidel 
Castro because o f his views and actions, but feels that under the harsh economic situation now 
facing Cuba, in conjunction with the political repression and human rights violations, the people 
will be willing, and in fact want to support, a "new” revolution. While these feelings may indeed 
exist within Cuba, it is highly unlikely that such an effort could succeed. The reasons for this are 
many, and by far outweigh the factors painting toward success.
The factors that reflect the inability of this scenario to be successful can be simplified into 
two basic areas. The first area can be viewed as ideological problems. The second area I refer to 
as practical or strategic matters.
Within the ideological area, there are naturally several problems that need to be considered. 
To begin with, any large scale invasion of Cuba, by forces originating in the United States would 
be viewed as nothing more than a U.S. proxy invasion. The repression of Cuba's will by the 
United States, and the history of that relationship is well known within Cuba. It is hard to
envision the Cuban people accepting a U.S. invasion force. While the Cuban people may be 
disenchanted with Fidel Castro or Communism, or both, and may wish to turn away from these, 
this does not mean that they want to return to U.S. control. It is much more likely that those 
within Cuba that are dissatisfied and favor change will look to change from within. This 
possibility shall be viewed in some detail below.
As for the reaction of Fidel Castro in this situation, his reaction I feel would be rather 
predictable. Throughout his career Fidel Castro has never been known to succumb to pressure; 
which may be a partial explanation for his political longevity. Not only has Castro refused to yield 
in the face of pressure, he is often likely to overreact to the situation and answer his opponent in 
more radical terms than can be expected. It matters not whether that pressure be political or 
military threats or actions. He has proven time and again a man that can not be intimidated. 
Arguable examples are the Bay of Figs, where he held his ground and prevailed, and many of the 
pressures exerted upon him in the events leading to the U.S. trade embargo in the early 1960s. 
There is no reason to assume that Castro would be any more likely to bow in the face o f an 
invasion today than he was during the Bay of Pigs. While it is possible to argue that Fidel has 
more domestic pressure upon him today, and the dissatisfaction among the Cuban people may lead 
to the victory for the Miami population, I do not think this is the case however. As has been 
stated, the Cuban people would most likely feel this was a proxy U.S. invasion, and Fidel Castro 
would make the most of this argument. Fidel would attempt to rally the nation around the banner 
of nationalism. Among the Cuban people Castro's position would become stronger as they 
support the fight against “U.S. Imperialism," and in the process, Fidel Castro. Throughout much 
of the world, and at least the Third World, Castro would be thrust back into the light o f heroism as 
he was seen as a David, standing up once again to the invading Goliath.
Since Fidel Castro would respond in all likelihood in full military force, an invasion of this 
sort would be a tremendously bloody affair. All the deaths would be Cuban, as is the case in any 
civil war, and numbers o f dead could only be enormous. This brings me to the next area o f  
problems, strategic concerns.
The first concern for the organizers o f such an invasion, after recmiting a sufficient number 
of volunteers would be to acquire enough equipment to arm the force properly. Given the size, 
and degree of technological advancement of the Cuban military, any force attempting an invasion 
would need to possess armament', comparable to the Cuban military in order to have a chance of 
survival, yet alone victory. This however would not pose that much of a problem. Money is not a 
major problem for the Cuban population in the United States.
The area of warfare the invading force would be most lacking in would be air power. 
While the Cuban Air Force could not compete with the U.S. military’s most advanced aircraft, the 
invaders would not have the resources to purchase this sort of weapons system, assuming the 
U.S. was willing to sell them planes, which would almost be impossible. No government has 
ever been willing to supply members of their citizenry with state of the art war planes. The only 
way the Miami population could hope to enjoy the benefits of this type of weapon, would be if the 
U.S. were to provide the air cover, with U.S. planes and pilots. This however would be just as 
impossible. To begin with, if the U.S. were to take such a direct role, this would be a U.S. 
invasion, and Washington might as well send Marines who could do a better job about it. Second, 
the U.S. is prohibited both by the agreement reached after the 62* missile crisis, and by U.S. law 
from taking these actions.15
In the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. supported, although not fully, the invasion of Cuba. Even 
with this partial support the invasion was doomed from the very beginning. There is no reason to 
believe that today would be any different. The Cuban military is much stronger today than it was 
in the early 1950s. They have better, as well as more, weapons systems, and pose a credible threat 
to well trained armed forces around the world. They proved their proficiency in combat while 
fighting in Africa. In would be next to impossible for a force such as would be assembled by the 
Miami population to have success against the well trained, armed and organized Cuban military.
lsGarthoff, “Cuban Missile Crisis/* in Horowitz (ed.), pp. 107-121.
The second or the military style operations, is that a small group of individuals would land 
covertly on Cuba and attempt to ignite a grass roots movement which will lead to the overthrow of 
Fidel Castro. This group would try to enlist the support of the Cuban population in the formation 
of an organized opposition to Fidel Castro.
Although this is a very real possibility, it shall not be viewed in very great detail, as its 
chances for success fall somewhere between slim and none. In the first place, the technological 
advancement and degree of training of the Cuban military would pose a major threat to anyone 
attempting to secretly enter Cuba. If one were to attempt to enter Cuba by any other than 
conventional means, they would most likely be detected and apprehended. Second, even if this 
group were able to avoid detection arid enter Cuba, their chances of survival would still remain 
rather low. The news of their presence and activities would without doubt be reported to the 
government by members of the population who support Fidel Castro. After this, their capture 
would be certain and swift. One needs to look no farther than the results of the recent group of 
three men who attempted to land secretly and start a similar process. These men were captured, 
tried and sentenced in the blink of an eye.1''
The last of the military style options to be considered within the scope of this paper, is an 
assassination attempt against Fidel Castro, carried out by the United States Government. It was 
stated above that this would most likely be carried out under the aegis of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).
While to some (mostly the naive) it may be a shock to consider as possible the 
assassination of a foreign head of state by the United States Government, such a scenario is quite 
realistic. Soon after Fidel had come to power the CIA began concocting a series of plots to both 
disrupt the new government and kill Fidel Castro. While such conspiracies were nefarious and ill- 
contrived, they were at least colorful. Some such plots included ”... slipping Fidel an exploding 
cigar.”17 These plots were usually carried out by Cuban nationals working for the CIA.
,6Give date of landing, and trial, maybe give results of trial, and cite news source.
,7Skidmore and Smith, Modem Latin America, pp.266.
Although not completely out of the realm of possibilities, this plan is as eas y to criticize as 
the previous military options. To begin with the ability to find someone willing or able to carry out 
such a plot today is highly questionable. In order for this plan to work, the CIA would need to 
have an agent within Cuba, that was able to get close to Fidel Castro. Since Castro has been in 
power for so long, in addition to the loss of many contacts throughout the years by the CIA, it 
would be very difficult to find a person able to carry out such a plan. Even when the CIA’s 
connections in Cuba were at their best, they were not able to carry out a successful assassination 
attempt against Castro.
The second factor prohibiting such action would be political repercussions. The political 
climate of today is extremely different than it was back in the early 1960s. Since Communism can 
no longer be perceived as a threat to the American way of life, Fidel Castro can not be portrayed as 
a threat either. We are hardly worried about an organized attack from the Soviet Union, so the 
threat of attack from Cuba is non existent. Even if Cuba were foolish enough to attempt an attack 
upon the United States, this action could hardly be seen as a threat to the United States. While 
Cuba’s militarization is quite extensive, their military does not posses the offensive power that 
would be necessary to successfully attack the United States. Given all of this, any assassination of 
Fidel Castro, sponsored by the United States would be viewed most harshly by the people of the 
United States (the Miami population excepted of course), the people and governments o f Latin 
America, as well as the rest of the world. It is hard to imagine the United States gaining support 
from even her closest allies for some time after the incident. Therefore, I think it can be safely said 
that this will not happen.
3,2 D m n tte Urii&ival
Military options to remove Castro have been tossed around practically since the day o f the 
Cuban revolution, since the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe in late IM 9 a new 
scenario has been repeatedly discussed, especially in the U.S. media. This more political option 
focuses on the likelihood of Castro being overthrown due to internal opposition. In this scenario
the lack of aid from the former Soviet Union and Soviet block nations is seen as directly affecting 
Castro's ability to keep up the standard of living for the Cuban people. This in turn, would 
translate into the disenchantment of the Cuban masses with communism, with FiJel Castro's 
rhetoric, and with Fidel Castro himself. The people of Cuba would then move away from 
communism and dictatorship, and push for an open, democratic, and market society. Such as 
happened in Eastern Europe in 1989, Castro's regime would quite simply collapse.
When looking at a thing such as this, an important first question is; why would the people 
want to do this? What would the motivation be for the Cuban masses? The answer to this is 
simple; hunger. Hunger not only for food, but for material goods, a higher standard o f living, and 
freedom. Hunger is a great motivator. It was Fidel Castro and his 26th of July movement's 
hunger to be free from the Batista regime and American imperialism that put Castro in power in the 
first place. The same thing can happen today. Politics, like the weather and the stock market, runs 
in cycles. If you wait around long enough the system will come full circle. The people of Cuba 
have tried communism for over 30 years. While Castro (not communism) has raised the standard 
o f living for the "average" Cuban, that trend has not continued. Although the standard o f living, 
health care and literacy is much higher in Cuba than in many portions of the world, it has 
deteriorated enough where the people will want more for themselves. No matter how good Fidel 
Castro may have been for Cuba, people always ask “what have you done for me lately?" When the 
people ask this question, they will see that their standard of living has gone down.
Although their lot may be better today than it was in the 1950s, in comparison to more 
recent times it has declined. One of the more noticeable items that have disappeared is cheap crude 
oil. The Soviet Union was the main source of crude oil for Cuba. Since mid 1990 the Soviet 
Union had been raising the price of the oil to near market levels, as well as delivering less. As can 
be expected in any modem nation, the effects of this lack of oil can be felt throughout the society. 
Such a lack of crude oil effects all the society in that the government was forced to impose austerity 
programs, and the agricultural sector must revert to pre-industrial methods of farming (ie. the use 
of horse and ox drawn plows), as well as countless lesser effects.
Cuba is very much an island today, in many ways. Geographically it is an island. It is the 
last island of Sov iet style communism (although this may be changing every day). Fidel Castro is 
an island. Castro is the last of the cold war era leaders. This does not mean that Cuba can not 
survive. They have survived for years under the U.S. trade embargo. While that has not or will 
not cause the downfall of Castro, the idea implicit in the embargo may. That idea is that if the 
Cuban people can aot live at the level they desire under Castro, then Castro will fall.
We have seen this type of action in Fastem Europe, The people of the former Soviet Block 
nations grew tired of communism, and thirsty for democracy and a free market. They grew tired 
of working hard for very little reward. As the former Soviet Union began to move away from 
communism, there was a domino effect. It is quite possible that the forces of this effect will strike 
Cuba. The Cuban people can see that their counterparts or comrades in Moscow, the center of the 
communist world, no longer think the system works and scrapped it. The leading nation of world 
i iiitnunism is trying to establish a free market democracy. While on paper and in speeches the 
communist and Castro ideoltgy sounds wonderful, when it comes to putting them into practice, it 
just can not be done. While it may have been possible to achieve all of Castro’s goals through 
communism and ideology, it just has not happened.
Without doubt Cuba is different from any other communist nation. Castro is different from 
every other leader. Cuba is an entity unto itself. As is Fidel Castro. Cuba is on the other side of 
the world from the turmoil currently felt in the old Soviet world. And I feel that Castro is worlds 
away from many of the ex-communist leaders. Although Fidel has ruled at times with an iron fist, 
and he is far from democratic, he is also not nearly as corrupt as leaders such as Czechoslovakia’s 
Ceausescu or even Batista. Dictators such as those were in the business not to heip the people of 
their country, but to help themselves. They amassed large personal fortunes, where Castro has 
not. While Ca? fro may have become more fond over the years o f some of the luxuries a head of 
state has access to, there is no evidence of which I am aware that Castro is corrupt. I do not think 
you can point to his taking advantage of luxuries as corruption. I think it was said best by Mel 
Brooks in his movie ’History of the World: Part I,” where he said, ’’Its good to be the King!” If
one can not enjoy the benefits of being the King, what is the point of being King? Castro does live 
better than the average Cuban, and better than he did in his early years,18 but this is not corruption. 
Castro has always led, at least at a base level, in the way h t thought best for Cuba. Castro has 
been egotistical, but he is also strongly nationalistic. His lack of corruption and commitment tn 
what he has thought the best course for Cuba may be the factors that help save him in the long run.
Under this scenario, Fidel Castro would be forced to step down due to public pressure 
against him. This catalyst for change could reach Castro in two main ways. The first way being 
the most direct. The people of Cuba, due to their hunger for change stage public protests and 
strikes, voicing their opposition as loudly as possible. Fidel Castro would hear the cries of his 
people and decide it best for the country, that he make way for the changes the people desire. 
Castro may also feel his stepping down is in his own best interest. Castro may feel he is in an 
impossible situation and the only way out, in which he may salvage some of his ideology, as well 
as his life, is to attempt the concessions his opponents demand.
Under the conditions listed above, however, this scenario would not work. To begin with, 
Castro still enjoys lather wide spread support among the Cuban people. Because o f his 
personality, Castro has been immune from many of the pressures felt by the more unpopular 
European leaders. A major reason for Castro's popularity, is that a large number of those against 
him have left the country.
A second reason why this scenario would not work is that there is not an organized 
opposition movement within Cuba. In order for strikes to take place and demonstrations to be 
held, there needs to be some sort of organization in place to start the ball rolling and define the 
goals of the movement. Even if all of the people in Cuba were to not go to work one day, and 
demonstrate in Havana, it would be meaningless if the protestors had no stated goals. There must 
be an organization to plan events, set down and define what the purpose and goal o f their actions 
are. At this point there is no such organized opposition in Cuba. There are three simple reasons
l*MThc Last Communist," Frontline documentary, Feb. 11,1992.
for this lack of opposition. The migration of many of the people who oppose Castro( Fidel would 
not be able to win any popularity contests among Cubans living in Miami). The organization of the 
Cuban government to highly discourage opposition. And the simple fact that Castro is popular 
among large segments of the population.
A third reason why mass uprisings would not work concerns the Cuban military. While 
this is not as important as the preceding two reasons, it is still worth noting. The militarization of 
Cuba is quite extensive. It is quite likely that such an uprising would become a terribly bloody 
affair. The threat of this would be discouraging to anyone planning such activity. This factor on 
its own may not be enough to stop protests, but when put in conjunction with the afore mentioned 
factors, it would become disheartening. Also, the persons in the lead o f such a movement would 
not be dealt with lightly.
And forth, the people may feel that the potential benefits of such a plan would not be 
w orthy of the risks involved. The Cuban people may feel that there is a danger of cither moving 
toward a leader who is worse than Castro, or back into a subordinate relationship with the United 
States. While reestablishing ties with the United States could be beneficial to the Cuban people, 
they may feel, due to communist propaganda, that this would lead to Cuba being subjected to U.S. 
domination and imperialism once again. Not to mention the risk of death. The people may just 
feel that the status quo is a preferable option.
The fifth factor that wilt make this scenario unlikely is the actions being taken by Fidel 
Castro and the Cuban Government today, before such a movement has even developed. While it is 
not yet clear if Fidel Castro intends to move away from socialism all together, it is clear that he is 
moving in that direction. It is entirely possible that Fidel will never move totally away from 
socialist philosophy, but that does not mean he will avoid a highly watered down version. 
Throughout his history, Fidel has never feared changing his mind. He was willing to sway from 
one direction to another in his early days, when his position may have been in jeopardy. Today, 
after 30 years in power, his position may be weakening, but not to the point where he can not
change Cuba’s direction and political philosophy. Not only can Castro move toward a mixed 
economy, he is.
In a recent interview, Castro himself openly admitted and justified the Cuban move toward 
a mixed economy. In this interview Castro said “I am disposed to...admit (that there are) 
elements...of capitalism in certain areas of our socialist system. [But] in no book of Marx, Engels, 
or Lenin is it said that it is possible to construct socialism without capital, without technology, and 
without markets... In the case of a small island like Cuba... it is especially difficult to develop using 
only one’s own recourses. It is for this reason that we have no alternative but to associate 
ourselves with foreign companies that can bring capital, technology, and markets... [W)e are 
dealing with...a world where a large part of the socialist system has c o l l a p s e d . I n  fact, by late 
November o f 1991, Cuba had already signed over 50 agreements with companies from other 
nations, and an additional 200 proposals were being considered. The companies involved with 
these joint ventures were primarily from Spain.20
As well as allowing for foreign investment, Cuba is allowing the formation of a few fully 
private Cuban companies. These companies would be owned by people thought trustworthy by 
the Communist Party, and run in a “normal” capitalistic fashion. And startlingly, according to a 
Cuban official, “a certain level of unemployment would be advisable to guarantee economic 
efficiency."21
A variant of this political argument considers the possibility of divisions within the regime. 
This would depend primarily upon the military either moving on its own against Castro, or feeling 
pressure from the people and moving against him in order to either preserve their own position, or 
attempting to do what they think will help Cuba.
To begin with, the military would not move on its own against Castro due to the amount of 
control he has over it. While select members of the military may attempt a move, it is
G illia n  Gunn, "Cuba's Search for Alternatives", in Current History. February 1992 pp.60. 
20ibid.
21 Gunn, Current History, February 1992, pp.61.
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inconceivably that the entire organization would remain united in such an effort. In addition to 
Castro's personal control, the head of the Cuban Armed Forces is Fidel's brother, Raul. It is hard 
to imagine any person moving against their own brother. Not to mention the fact that Raul has 
always seemed to be more hard-line and non-democratic than Fidel.
As for the military feeling pressure from the people, this option is also dead before it 
begins. Since such an organization is not currently in existence, and for the afore mention reasons, 
such a movement seems unlikely. One needs to look no further to realize the impossibility of this 
option. If conditions were to change (even though I find that highly unlikely) the military's 
involvement would be possible. Highly unlikely, but never the less possible.
3-J Internalional RealiM-msnl?
The catalyst for this paper has been the changing climate o f the world, the death o f the 
Soviet Union, and the end o f the Cold War. There have been major political realignments 
throughout the world (ie. Easter Europe), and the possibility that this may effect Cuba's political 
scene is quite real. The next scenario to be dealt with involves such political realignments on an 
international scale. There are two separate but related courses that realignment may take. The first 
possible course involves the United States changing it's position with regards to Cuba, and the 
second, Cuba changing it's positions both domestically, and on the world scene.
The end of the cold war has brought obvious changes throughout the world. The former 
Soviet Union and the United States are working together in ways that could not have been dreamed 
of in the 1950’s. The two superpowers that were once arch enemies are now (as this paper is 
being written) engaging in the sale of technologies unthinkable during the cold war. The United 
States government, and private citizens in America, are sending aid to the former Soviet Republics. 
At a glance, it would be difficult for the untrained observer to realize that these two nations are the 
same two that have been mortal enemies for decades, and the same two nations that almost took the 
world into nuclear war in October of 1962. The same two nations whose actions had the world 
teetering on the brink of a nuclear holocaust, today seem to almost be becoming allies. It is ironic
that the country who played host to the October of 1962 missile crisis, and event which showed 
that in the most critical of moments the superpowers were capable o f responsible discussion and 
decisions, is today one of the last bastions of communism and a prime example of irrational and 
incompetent diplomacy by the United States.
With the fall of the Soviet Union it is difficult to think of Cuba as threatening to the United 
States. They are obviously not a threat economically. Communism is not a threat to the “American 
way o f Life.*' And the U.S. hardly needs to fear Cuba militarily. So it is difficult to think of a 
legitimate reason for the continued non-relationship between our two nations.
3 .3 .1 . N orm aliza tio n  o f  R elations w ith the U nited S tates
Under this option, and the current circumstances facing the world, the United States 
government will change it's position with regards to Cuba. There will be an effort by the U.S. to 
re-open diplomatic relations with Cuba and solve the many differences that face the two nations 
through diplomatic means. From such an effort, if it were to be carried out competently and 
successfully, Cuba would eventually drift back into the sphere of influence of the United States.
Since the United States and Cuba broke diplomatic relations, there has been, with the 
exception of the brief initiatives during the Carter years, virtually no effort to open a dialogue with 
Havana. While Cuba has commanded attention on numerous occasions in the U.S., these 
occasions were primarily problematic; crises and events which served as propaganda favoring the 
anti-Castro organizations in the U.S. (ie. Cubans fleeing to the United States). With the 
imposition o f the trade embargo and restrictions upon trade to and from Cuba, the average U.S. 
citizen neither sees not hears much on Cuba. U.S. citizens were able to travel directly to the 
U.S.S.R throughout much of the cold war as tourists. However, in the case of Cuba, a U.S. 
citizen wishing to travel to Cuba needed to obtain a visa through the Swiss embassy (which was 
much easier said than done) and stilt could not travel directly from a U.S. city to Havana. It was 
necessary to either pass through Toronto or Mexico City if one wished to visit Cuba. This is still
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the case today. Therefore interest in Cuba, among the people of the United States, has been small. 
Interest within the United States Government has appeared to be about the same.
Although the United States and Cuba have had a limited dialogue since officially breaking 
diplomatic relations the U.S. still does not diplomatically recognize Cuba. The closest the U.S. 
and Cuba came to a “normal" relationship and dialogue was during the Carter Administration. 
Under President Carter the United States opened the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. This 
Interests Section was a de facto embassy headed by Wayne Smith. In fact, the Interest Section 
was even housed in the building that was the embassy prior to the break.
Although there was a discussion between Cuba and the U.S. through the Interest Section, 
according to the accounts of Wayne Smith, this was rather unproductive. The indecision and lack 
o f conviction on the part of the Carter Administration caused confusion within the Cuban 
government as to U.S. intentions. This poor diplomacy on the part of the U.S. and the victory of 
Ronald Reagan in the 1980 Presidential election meant that the hope for constructive progress 
would remain unfulfilled. Prior to his election (and part of the reason for his victory) Reagan 
vowed to take a much tougher stance against the Soviet Union and Communism in general than 
had been the case under his predecessor. This spelled the end to any hope of negotiations and the 
Cubans knew it.
Given Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals, his tough stance toward communist Cuba 
may have been justifiable. Today, however, Cuba poses no credible threat to United States 
interests. So why does the U.S. continue a hostile relationship with Fidel Castro and Cuba? Since 
strategic and economic concerns have already been put aside, we are left with political reasons (or 
stupidity).
To begin with, Republicans have controlled the Presidency for twelve years. Ronald 
Reagan resided in the White House for eight of those years. Aside from the Republican's higher 
interest in foreign policy than domestic, and their natural abhorrence for communism, the Cuban 
population in Miami has significant pull within the Republican Party. They have used that political 
power and money to encourage the continuation of hostility between Cuba and the United States.
Another reason for this continued hostility could be image and propaganda. It has been 
embarrassing for Washington, the center for the fight against Communism, to have a communist 
dictator only 90 miles south of U.S. borders. It is a blow to the ego for a superpower to be defied 
by the brash leader of a small island nation. The danger of appearing to be defeated by Cuba spurs 
hostility. The propaganda value of the hard line stance against Cuba is easy to explain. 
Washington always needs a scapegoat or someone to point the finger at as the cause of problems 
(or to divert attention from the problems). Even now that communism is for all practical purposes 
dead, Cuba can still be used as a rallying point for negative sentiment. Presidents will always need 
a way to appear strong. Cuba has seemed to become the designated Bobo doll for the U.S. to 
verbally beat up.
If these are the reasons for the poor state of relations between the U.S. and Cuba, the 
continuation o f the status quo is both irrational and short sighted. A question that must be 
addressed is why? Not why to continue the status quo, but why break from it. What purpose 
could be served by opening diplomatic relations and moving closer to Cuba? This must not only 
be addressed by the U.S. government, but by Cuba as well.
The first way to answer the question of why work for improved relations, is with a 
question: Why not? The reasons given to support the status quo, given the world climate, are not 
good enough. The U.S. has diplomatic relations with many nations with whom we disagree both 
practically and philosophically. Granted the case of the U.S.S.R. was different. The Soviet 
Union was a superpower and a threat. Prudence (and the fate of humanity) demanded we keep 
open a line of dialogue. Where Cuba is a small nation that does not directly threaten the U.S., and 
it is not imperative we interact. While this argument can be used to support the status quo, it is 
also a strong argument for improving relations. The Soviet case aside, the U.S. also has 
diplomatic relations with nations such as China and South Africa. While condemning actions the 
Chinese took in the slaughter of students at Tien-an-men Square, the U.S. did not break diplomatic 
relations. In fact today China retains a favored nation trading status with the U.S. Something very
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odd considering that our two nations are on opposite ends of the political spectrum (much the same 
as Cuba).
In the case of South Africa, the IJ.S. once again condemned the racist government, and 
sanctions were put in place. However diplomatic channels have not been abandoned. While trade 
was cut back upon, tourism continued and consulates were maintained in the respective nations. 
While Fidel Castro is not Snow White, he has also not been responsible for the type of activity 
seen in China. He can not be called a racist either. In fact, racism is lower in Cuba than in many 
parts of the world.
31.3 .^..Cubam rns iq Third World
Regardless of whether the Republican or Democratic Party controls the White House, or if 
an independent wins the 1992 election, the continuation of the current policies toward Cuba will 
most likely continue. The consequence of this state of affairs, is that the probable influence of the 
U.S. on Cuba, which would result from open and non-adversarial relations, is surly not to come. 
Given the likelihood of sour U.S.-Cuban relations, Cuba's realignment in the wake of the collapse 
of communism in the Soviet Block, is likely to entail a diversification of trading partners. Castro 
will probably lead Cuba away from the former Soviet Republics that were the Soviet Union, and 
away from the United States. While he may not shun aid that these nations may offer, he wifi not 
go out o f his way to solicit it. Rather than try and court the support from them, he will make an 
effort to trade with the non-aligned states and the other nations of the world. Castro will lead the 
economy of Cuba away from socialism, and toward a more open market system. This is not to say 
Cuba will end up in a true capitalist system, but they will no longer be truly socialist either. Castro 
will try and solicit smaller amounts of aid from the non-aligned states, as well as trying to entice 
investment from foreign companies.
Why would Castro do this? Why would Castro move away from a system that he claims to 
be fully behind to this day? Although he may claim otherwise in the future, the correct answer is 
probably because he has to. He is unable to receive aid from the former U.S.S.R. He does not
have the money to pay for the social programs that have been his strength. He does not have the 
ability to purchase the oil every' nation needs. As a small island nation whose two strongest assets 
are it’s sugar growing ability and it's tourism capabilities, Cuba lacks the natural resources 
necessary to industrialize alone. If Castro wishes to put Cuba in a truly non-aligned, independent 
position, it will be necessary for him to industrialize, and advance technologically. For Castro to 
be able to do this he must look to outside sources for capital. If things were to remain as bad as 
they are now in Cuba, Castro's chances for maintaining power would dwindle considerably.
The economy of Cuba is currently in peril. The traffic on Cuban streets has turned from 
cars to animal drawn carts and bicycles. In the rural areas tractors have been replaced by oxen. 
Unless something is done soon, Cuba w ill be caught in a downward spiral. They do not have the 
money for oil. Without oil. they cannot reach the level of agricultural efficiency necessary' to raise 
the money needed. Castro will have to do something. He will have to face the fact that aside from 
Cuba, Soviet style communism has died.
Castro will also need the foreign trade in order to induce his population to work. For some 
time Cuba has had the problem of full employment. It is a problem because everyone has job 
security, and the stores have no material goods for the people to buy. Since all the people are able 
to spend money on is food, there is very little incentive to work (yet alone work hard). If a person 
is able to buy all they need by working only 20 hours per week, and there are no goods available 
for purchase beyond basic necessities, then there is little incentive to work beyond that point. 
Consequently, absenteeism has become a problem for the Cuban economy. Moral incentives may 
be a One motivator in the short term, but it is hard to expect those incentives to work for decades. 
This absenteeism leads to lower productivity, and pushes Cuba even further into a hole. By 
trading in a more capitalistic way both at home and with other nations, Cuba will be able to offer 
more consumer goods to their people. This will in turn give the people something to work for, 
both as consumers and business owners.
All this is not to say Castro will abandon the social programs that have been his strong 
points over the years (ie. schools and health care). In fact if the economy can be improved,
Castro will be able to enhance them with better technology and more money. There is no reason to 
think he would privatize such things. In fact it would be foolish for him to consider it. While 
impossible to pick one thing that has kept Castro in power and kept support for him among the 
people, the social programs such as education and health care would rank high on the list.
So what types of things could be turned over to private enterprise? Obviously education 
and health care will not be turned over to the private sector, but what will? That is very difficult to 
say with any certainty. The first area which would be beneficial to hand over to private control 
would be agriculture and food related industries. The institution of farmer's markets and 
privatization of food stands and restaurants would serve several purposes. To begin with, history 
has shown productivity would go up in private hands. More food would be available to the 
people. As well, as in the Soviet Union, there would be more variety. Although prices may go 
up, that is not necessarily a bad thing. The producers would work harder for the added profits, 
and the consumers would work harder to buy the food. Productivity in general would rise. In 
addition to the rise in variety of food, amount of food, and productivity, privatization would 
reintroduce, and in many cases introduce the ^op le  to a capitalist system. For a society that has 
been communist for over 30 years, people will need to learn how to survive in a capitalist world. 
It will train people in how to run a business, and train consumers on how to buy goods in a 
capitalist market place. The second area which should be in private hands is tourism. Businesses 
in private hands would be more responsive to the public's desires than would a governmental 
bureaucracy. This also would teach people how to run a business that must serve the public in a 
competitive environment. The privatisation of tourism would not necessarily need to be confined 
to large Hotel/Resorts (for which foreigt. investment would be needed, as private Cuban citizens 
would not have the capital necessary for such a venture, not the expertise to run such a business 
from the ground up). The Cuban government would be able to (and should) allow private citizens 
to run other tourist related businesses, such as sport fishing and diving charters, souvenir stands 
and dance clubs. The only way for any of this to succeed, however, is for the Cuban government 
to allow a degree o f unemployment.
/This is what should be done, and in fact to a degree, it is being done.22 Castro is currently 
seeking out investment in various areas of the Cuban economy (ie. telecommunications and durable 
goods production), and allowing ownership of businesses by Cuban citizens that are Mloya)M to the 
party. Castro is even going so far as to allow 100% ownership by some foreign firms. These 
companies are primarily from Spain and Mexico. This shows that Castro is indeed facing the 
realities of his situation. He has not become out of touch with the realities of life in Cuba, as some 
would contend. He has begun to take the steps necessary to reintegrate Cuba into the world 
economy, and bring his own economy and country back into the 20th century.
Under this scenario, which is the most likely of those considered so fa:, Castro would react 
to recent changes in the global arena and thus remain firmly in control. There is no doubt that a 
stronger Cuban economy will help Castro. The question is whether Castro go far enough in his 
opening of the Cuban economy? And will enough foreign firms be willing to invest in Cuba, in 
the area it is needed most? Although not precluding foreign investment, the trade embargo does 
hinder it. It locks many American firms out of trade with Cub i. This not only hurts Cuba, but 
also the U.S. companies that could gain from the additional busin ?ss. In fact, in the process it also 
hurts the U.S. economy (although to a much smaller degree than the Cuban economy).
Will Castro survive if this course of action is followed? That relics heavily upon whether 
or not he goes far enough. If he lacks the conviction to see the process through, and vacillates on 
domestic policy decisions, his position will become precarious. Lack of conviction has not been a 
problem for Castro. One problem he has had, however, has been a willingness to follow courses 
of action without properly studying them. And in some instances ignoring advice from experts.2 3 
If Castro continues to open the Cuban economy in a logical manner his chances of success are 
great. What is meant by logical? Castro must reach a balance. He must be cautious to not move 
too slowly, while not moving too rapidly mid carelessly. Although Castro must avoid careless 
decisions, he must alio avoid indecision. Either extreme could spell defeat for the program as well
22Ibid.
23"The Last Communist,** Frontline documentary, Feb. 11, 1992.
as Castro. This was the situation faced by Gorbachev in the Sov iet Union. By not moving fast 
enough for some, while moving too quickly for oihers, Gorbachev succeeded only in gaining 
disapproval from all. Once again, time shall judge whether or not C astro’s decisions and pace 
have been the proper ones.
What could spell defeat for the programs being inst i tuted i n 
Cuba? If Castro avoids mistakes in his implementation of the program, then what could possibly 
go wrong? The thing ( astro should fear the most is the same thing he has been doing battle with 
since he took power. Namely, the United States of America. The United States can derail the 
process in more ways that not doing business with C uba. By putting pressure on other nations, 
and corporations within those nations, the U.S. can stem the flow’ of trade and investment to Cuba. 
To a certain extent, the U.S. has begun to do this already. Washington’s position toward 
companies trading with C uba is that they may not trade in the United States. While this may not 
stop all the companies, it will certainly discourage some from pursuing the option. This, in 
conjunction with pressure from the U.S., and anti-Castro groups in the U.S., on the subjects of 
human rights could hinder the efforts at reform.
Castro could stop criticism and pressure virtually in its tracks, if he were to take some 
rather simple steps. The basis for many of the attachs upon him and his country are based upon 
human rights violations. If Castro were to halt the persecution and jailing of Cuban citizens on the 
basis of political views, he would take away the rallying point for his detractors. All o f these 
groups would be hard pressed to find a cause for complaint. The odds are that they would And 
some reason to call for his ouster, but their best weapon would have been taken from them. Castro 
would look much better in front o f the world if he were to show more respect for human rights in 
the course o f economic, for lack of political, reform. This may in turn encourage sympathy for 
Castro, particularly in the Third World, and encourage more nations and coiporations to trade with 
him. If the reasons given by the United States were felt to be largely superfluous, many nations 
may disregard the call for exclusion.
One thing is for sure, given the seemingly unchanging view of the United States, and the 
economic position of the former Republics of the Soviet Union, the course of action described 
above is Castro's best option. His position is not an enviable one. Inaction would almost certainly 
lead to his downfall. While a failing effort may have the same result. Ilis situation is worsened by 
the United States, who not only refuses to help it's neighbor, but is willing to take action to 
worsen the situation. Castro is caught in a situation where he may lead the horse to water, but will 
never get an opportunity to make it drink, because the United States stoic the pond. Castro's odds 
of success would be much greater if he were given a level playing field. Fven today, after over 30 
years of broken relations with Cuba, the United States still has the power to exert control over the 
small nation. One can easily sec why Castro wishes to gain true economic independence from the 
United States.
3 ,4 , D em ocratization  From Above
This final scenario examines the possibility of Fidel Castro opening the political system, 
and introducing democracy from above. While it may seem unlikely at the outset for such an event 
to take place, stranger things have happened. Three years ago, there were not many people 
predicting the fall of the Soviet Union. The possibility of democracy in the U.S.S.R. existed, but 
there was no talk of the nation as a whole going under. So while Castro initiating democracy may 
seem unlikely, it is an option that must be addressed.
Castro is in the process of instituting an economic reform program, and could use such a 
reformist atmosphere to propel him toward democratic reform. Under this scenario Castro would 
allow the formation of formal opposition to the Government Party. An important question once 
again, is why? Why, after over 30 years in power, would Castro be willing to open the political 
system, and step down? There are three possibilities.
First, Castro may feel that he has done a good job, been a national hero, and fulfilled his 
obligation to his country. He may feel that history will view his accomplishments so far in a 
favorable light, and if he were to step down gracefully and responsibly, history and the world will
view him all the better, Where as if he were to overstay his welcome, the lessons he has provided 
for his people may be lost.
Castro has always been interested in history. In fact he has patterned much of his career, 
particularly his public speaking style, after Benito Mussolini, the former Italian dictator. He feels 
that he has done a superb job as the leader of Cuba. He took Cuba out of U.S. control, and the 
hands of corrupt leaders such as Batista. He has taken away many of the social injustices that had 
afflicted Cuba. He improved the educational system, and achieved record levels of literacy. He 
revamped the health care system, providing basic services in areas that had never seen a doctor, 
Castro has taken Cuba from a position of being nothing more than a tropical appendage to the 
United States, and made the nation into one which has been a legitimate player on the international 
scene. While not all of his decisions have met with success, he has without question had a 
favorable influence on the course of Cuban history.
Although Castro has done a superb job, he must realize that all good things must come to 
an end. Because of either political conditions or mother nature, Castro will eventually need to step 
down. If he is to recognize and accept that his time has come, the perception o f him, as being a 
truly wise leader shall only be enhanced. However, if he were to stay past his point o f usefulness, 
the perception of him could be different. If he wishes 'he youth of Cuba to learn from his 
leadership, he must be sure to step down gracefully. If Cuba's youth does not respect Castro, they 
will not respect all he has done. And if they do not respect his work, they will not learn anything 
from it, and in the long run, all that Castro has strived to accomplish shall be lost. Castro has 
shown he knows how to take charge, now he must show he knows how to step down.
Just because he chooses to step down, does not mean he will do so democratically. He 
may choose democracy for reasons similar to those just discussed. By turning over command to 
another dictator, Castro does two things. First he implicitly says to his people, that he does not 
trust them to run the country. This says that he has not educated his people as well as he may 
think. He has obviously not taught his people how to govern, and therefore has not been a good 
leader. Where if he entrusts the country to the people, in a democratic way, it is like a parent
showing confidence in the way she raised a child, by allowing that child to make choices on its 
own. Second, Castro takes the chance of allowing a person to have dictatorial powers that may not 
be as responsible as him. He leaves the door open for someone to turn the country back to foreign 
domination. Although there is no guarantee that this will not happen through democracy, at least if 
it did happen, it would be a collective, national decision. Therefore, he may feel democratic reform 
to be the better course of action.
This is not to mention the fact that he may run. and indeed win the elections. If he does not 
truly wish to step down, he can accomplish all of the things above, and retain power, if he were to 
win an election. His victory would only confirm, beyond all doubt, his legitimacy as leader o f 
Cuba. If he were to win, he could improve his image within Cuba, and in front of the world. 
Many of his critics around the world, and the United States, would be silenced. He would 
command even more respect historically. If he were to loose, and accept the results, he would gain 
the same level of respect as if he were to simply step down, and not run. All that would be lost is 
the election.
The second reason for his democratization of Cuba is because he feels Cuba would be 
served best by his departure fnm  the political scene. This second possibility incorporates many of 
the points discussed above. However this also deals with more of the realities o f life. There are 
two main realities which Castro may have to deal with. The first may not be inevitable, the second 
is. First, the only way out o f the economic doldrums for Cuba may be aid from the U.S. This aid 
would only be available if Castro were gone. Castro may realize this, and for the sake of his 
people, step down. While he would certainly not be happy about bowing to U.S. pressure, he 
may be willing to do so in order to save future generations. The second reality is much less 
complex. Death. While he does not have one foot in the grave, he is growing older, and must 
realize he can not stay in power for ever. Even if he wanted too, Mother Nature would eventually 
catch up with him. This, in conjunction with the economic and political realities facing Cuba, may 
compel him to take this opportunity to pass the rains of control.
Castro must realize that if he were to die suddenly, there does not exist a mechanism for the 
smooth transfer of power. If he were to institute democracy, there would be a system in place to 
ensure the peaceful change of power after he departs. Without such a system, a political vacuum 
would exist, through which a bloody confrontation could develop. If Castro were to institute 
democracy now, however, he could supervise the birth of a new Cuba, and the transfer of power. 
Therefore, for the sake of Cuba, and for the sake of the children, Castro may decide the best 
course of action for all is for him to step down.
The third and final possibility for Castro's democratization of Cuba is a very' practical one. 
Castro may realize that he is in an impossible situation. The economy is terrible, and the best 
source for aid, the United States, is unwilling to speak with Castro. He may feel he is finally 
isolated, and without this aid, Cuba will be unable to pull itself out of the current economic 
situation. If Cuba is to remain in it's current situation, Castro may feel that his position becomes 
more and more untenable. In fact, his life may even become endangered. Castro may feel that his 
days are numbered. He may feel that the only way to save his country from a bloody civil war, 
and possibly to save his own life, is to step down, and hold elections.
If the situation in Cuba were to degenerate to the point where these were major concerns for 
Castro, conditions would most likely not allow for another communist dictator to take over. Once 
the situation reached that point, the people would be as disenchanted with communism and 
dictatorship as they were with Fidel Castro himself. The people would not accept a change in the 
man, without a change in the system, if  it were only a different face in control, the atmosphere 
among the people would not change. The people would feel that Castro was still in charge, and the 
new leader was nothing more than his puppet. For Castro to avoid the political turmoil, the new 
leader could not be chosen by him. Castro would have to hold elections. As if  he did not choose 
his successor, the only other legitimate avenue for selection would be the people.
While his life is not currently in danger, the situation could change rapidly in a country that 
becomes more and more disenchanted by the day with the economy. If Castro can not improve the 
situation in Cuba, he may have no choice but to turn to democracy.
So regardless of the reason, be it one of the possibilities listed above, all o f  them, or none 
of them, will Castro actually institute democracy in Cuba. The answer is no. At least in the near 
future. Although he may one day follow this course of action, that day is still far off. At present, 
there is no reason to believe that Castro intends to step down. The economic situation in Cuba is 
bad. However, the people of Cuba have experienced hardship before. At present there is no sign 
of revolutionary fervor in Cuba. Therefore, his life, and his power, are not in grave danger. 
While he may eventually bow out for historic or other reasons, he will not be forced from power.
To begin with, Castro has never run from a fight. Whenever he has been confronted, 
Castro has always dug in, and refused to give ground. If he were confronted at home, he would 
respond the same way. Castro would not give in without a fight.
Although he can’t be pushed or coerced into something, he may be able to be persuaded. If 
friends both at home and from other nations were to talk with him, and stress the positive tea sons 
for his departure (discussed above), he may be persuaded to reform the country. Since there is no 
Indication that he is presently inclined in that direction, one can only guess that if it were to happen, 
it would be at least three to five years down the road, possible longer. Castro is moving Cuba 
toward a semi-mixed economy, and could also move toward the democratization o f Cuba. This 
however is much less likely. Castro has been characterized as “not having a democratic bone in his 
body.*’24 While he has allowed some democratic reform, it has been at the local levels o f  
government. At the higher levels o f government, Castro has not moved towatd democracy. Docs 
this weaken or strengthen Castro’s position? Only time shall answer that. Although he may not 
have a democratic bone in his body, people do change, particularly as they grow older. Castro has 
certainly mellowed from the time he took power. But is he capable of change in such a 
fundamental way? in the short term, no. In the long term however, it is a distinct possibility.
A second reason why he may not give up power is power itself. Although history is 
important to Castro, power is more important. Given a choice between the two, Castro would
24W. Smith speech, Feb. 5, 1992.
choose power. He is very egotistical. He feels that he and he alone is capable of leading Cuba. 
Therefore the best option is for him to lead the nation for as long as possible.
4 . C o n c lu sio n
This paper has considered what the future may hold for Fidel Castro and the Cuban 
revolution. Current political trends bespeak change. Given the degree of change throughout the 
world, the possibility of change within Cuba is great. In fact change will take place in Cuba. If 
Castro does not make changes within his nation, change may be forced upon him. The fall of the 
Soviet Union may have a greater influence on Castro’s future than Moscow had ever had. It was 
the purpose of this paper to look at several of the main possibilities that await Cuba and Fidel 
Castro, and to determine the likelihood of each.
The first option examined was determined to be the least likely. It is that of the physical 
removal of Fidel Castro by a military force. It was determined that such a force would come from 
either organizations run by Cuban exiles in Miami, or the United States government. It does not 
matter which sponsored such a move, as it would fail politically. Within Cuba the exiles would 
have the better chance among tiie Cuban people. Militarily, the U.S. would hold the upper hand. 
However, both would be defeated, as both forces would be seen by the Cuban people as nothing 
more than an example of U.S. imperialism. Washington will realize that such an effort would be 
an exercise in futility, and therefore would not attempt it. If the exiles attempted this without U.S. 
support, Castro would be able to destroy them on the battlefield. Castro has a greater chance of 
being struck by lightning than being subjected to such an attack.
The second scenario dealt with Castro being removed from power through a domestic 
political upheaval. The Cuban people would rise up against Castro and demand his exit from the 
political scene. This, however, was doomed from the outset by the lack of organized opposition 
within Cuba. For sud* a popular movement to take place, there first needs to be a consensus 
among the people that Castro must go. Then, there needs to be an organization in place to 
coordinate efforts and define a common goal. Neither o f these conditions have been met.
Although this scenario seems more likely than the first, it is still a rather remote possibility. As 
opposed to the odds of being struck by lightning, this scenario has about the same chance as 
Castro winning the Illinois Lottery and collecting the money.
Within the third scenario. U.S. reluctance to change it s position toward Castro and Cuba 
will most likely lead to the continuation of the status quo. If the U.S. were to change it’s position, 
and deal with Castro, they would at least have a modus operandi through which to influence Cuban 
politics. U.S. unwillingness to do so however, pushes Castro toward realignment and economic 
d iverse  cation. Such diversification may lead to the solution, or at least improvement o f the 
economic situation facing Castro. The improvement of the economic situation may lead to Castro 
retaining power. The obsession within the I S. government toward Cuba precludes them from 
realizing this however. Such U.S. actions, or inactions, break with U.S. policies toward other 
communist and adversarial nations (ie. Mexico, China, North Korea, and the former Soviet 
Union), aggravates an already tense relationship, further alienates the Cuban people, strengthens 
Castro's position, and in general moves the U.S. away from it's stated goals.
Cuba's economic diversification is the best option for Castro. If he does not diversify and 
open his economy, his position will weaken, increasing the likelihood of his overthrow, i f  Castro 
were to diversify, his position could be strengthened. Therefore, this scenario was deemed to be 
the most likely of those considered.
The last scenario looked at involved Castro instituting democracy from above. While there 
were several reasons why Castro could do this, it was determined that, at least for the short term, 
he would not institute democracy in Cuba.
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